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Attacks by (jihadi) terrorists have become more frequent over the past decade. 
As the neighbouring countries experienced more frequent and more deadly 
terrorist attacks (see Figure 1), the Dutch authorities grew increasingly con-
cerned about the possibility of similar attacks happening in the Netherlands. 
In particular, the threat of Dutch (jihadi) terrorists acquiring heavy firearms to 
conduct Bataclan-like attacks loomed in the back of policymakers’ minds. 
Preventing such heavy firearms from falling into the wrong hands became a 
top policy priority. In 2016, this led the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security 
to commission a study on how firearms are acquired by terrorists, specifically 
                                                          
1  The authors are research consultants at Ecorys Netherlands, an international re-
search and consultancy organisation. This chapter is based on a study for the Sci-
entific Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Dutch Ministry of 
Justice and Security, which was completed by a project team consisting of Dr. 
Brigitte Slot, Dr. Saraï Sapulete, Niels van Wanrooij MSc (Ecorys) and Ms. 
Monique Bruinsma (Bureau Bruinsma) in 2016-2017. We are very grateful for the 
assistance by the WODC and by the generous collaboration offered by the Na-
tional Police, especially by one of their analysts– who aided our data collection 
immensely – as well as the National Team Firearms Expertise and the National 




looking at interactions between firearms dealers, organised crime, and terror-
ists (suspects).  
 
Figure 1. 
Selected terrorist attacks in Europe, 2004 - 2017 
 
Source: AFP 
An extensive literature exists on the presumed connection between organised 
crime and terrorism, in academia (for example, Laqueur, 2000; Makarenko, 
2004; Basra, Neumann and Brunner, 2016) and, in line with the development 
of the phenomenon in Europe, in European policy papers (for example 
Makarenko and Mesquitaa, 2014; West Sands Advisory LLP, 2012; Renard, 
2016; Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2013). In addition, much has 
been written specifically about how the firearms trade operates in Europe 
(Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2014; Flemish Peace Institute, 
2018) and on the firearms used in mass shootings (Duquet, 2016).  
 At the same time, while media report about the routes travelled by jihadis 
and their firearms proliferated (see Figure 2; Der Spiegel, 24 March 2016; 
NRC, 15 July 2016;) very little empirical research is conducted on the rela-
tionship between terrorism and organised crime (Hübschle, 2011). Although 
presumably intelligence services and law enforcement agencies have access 
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to the relevant data – and one expects they exploit this data to counteract po-
tential threats – such information is not shared with the public. While this is 
understandable from the point of view of law enforcement, it does not help 
address questions about the (development of the) nature of the phenomenon, 
hampering a better understanding and a public debate on the issues. 
 
Figure 2.  
Delivery route of firearms used in terrorist attacks in Europe  
 
Source: Der Spiegel (24 March 2016) 
 
b. Research question  
 
Two main assertions follow from the literature on the organised crime-terror 
nexus. On the one hand, terrorist groups are posited to increasingly act like 
organised crime groups in order to obtain their money. On the other hand, 
profit-maximising criminal groups will not ask too many questions when they 
are able to sell their products to whomever, jihadis included.  
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 Research regarding the profiles of Dutch jihadi terrorists has shown that in 
many cases, they have a criminal history (Poot and Sonnenschein, 2009; Bie, 
2016). Research by Veldhuis (2016) implicates prisons as pivotal locations 
where criminals and terrorists meet, and in some cases petty criminals can be 
recruited as terrorists. It seems the attacks in Paris (2015) and Denmark (2015) 
were committed by petty criminals thus recruited (NCTV, 2015). The terror-
ists were able to rely on their old criminal networks to obtain their firearms, 
and the suppliers of the firearms seem not in all cases to be aware that their 
old buddy has become a terrorist. 
 The situation described above holds for the case of the Netherlands as well: 
although there is a reliable literature on the operation of the firearms trade 
(Boerman and Bruinsma, 2012; Bruinsma and Moors, 2005; Dienst Nationale 
Recherche, 2006; NRC, 13 July 2016a; 13 July 2016b), and an emerging lit-
erature on Dutch terrorist networks (Bie, 2016; Poot and Sonnenschein, 2009), 
empirical research on the link between the two is lacking. The scientific de-
partment of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security recognised this gap and 
commissioned a study on the situation in the Netherlands.  
 After conducting a literature review on how Dutch (jihadi) terrorist groups 
acquire their firearms, the study sought to answer the following research ques-
tion with regard to organised crime and terrorists: 
 
Are organised crime and jihadi terrorist networks in the Netherlands inter-
woven? If so, what does this interwovenness look like? 
 
The concept ‘interwoven networks’ is defined as follows: the lack of a clear 
boundary between two networks, characterised by a (partial, but structural) 
overlap of networks. As applied and operationalised in our Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) methodology, overlapping networks would be characterised 
by members of a network being part of both an organised crime network and 
a jihadi terrorist network. 
 This question has been explored by way of a SNA (Social Network Anal-
ysis on a specific case, namely that of the Slovakian firearms dealer AFG (see 
below). The identification of the starting group was crucial to the potential of 
the study itself. An extensive consultation was organised to identify the most 
relevant, and potentially fruitful ‘case’, and inputs were gathered from experts 
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at the National Police, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the counter-terrorism 
coordinator (NCTV), and the intelligence service (AIVD). 
 The SNA was thus applied to a major case involving organised crime, fire-
arms dealers and – as became apparent – terrorist suspects. The study can best 
be understood as an explorative case study (Gerring, 2007) where a tentative 





a. Social network analysis 
 
The main body of the study consisted of a Social Network Analysis. Such an 
analysis provides a method to study social structures. The focus is not on in-
dividual actors (or nodes), but on the relationships between them. Actors can 
be individuals, but also organisations, countries, etc. The relationship can be 
defined by several types of links, e.g. kinship, friendship, financial transac-
tions, etc. Social network analysis thus gives us a “formal, conceptual means 
for thinking about the social world” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The social 
network analysis method gives an in-depth insight into the dynamics and links 
between actors. Moreover, it allows for identifying main actors and their func-
tion (e.g. connectors, influencers) within the network.  
 Social network analysis provides added-value by showing not only how 
actors are interlinked but also who are the essential actors within a particular 
network. Moreover, a social network analysis allows for an easy comparabil-
ity with other networks by analysing the network characteristics (fragmented 
or fully connected structures) and the ease of interaction (ability to form con-
nections) between actors.  
 
b. The case: the AFG firearms dealer 
 
Since 2014, European law enforcement investigators have been observing the 
Slovakian (web)shop AFG, located in the small town of Partizánske. This 
shop sells deactivated firearms throughout Europe on their premises and via 
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their website (see Figure 3). The German Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Police) 
estimated in 2016 that some 14.000 of these firearms were in circulation in the 
EU. These firearms were deactivated in a way that made reactivation into 
‘live’ firearms relatively easy. Because of a loophole in European legislation 
this method of deactivation was legal at the time, even if reactivating them 
was not.  
 This presented an opportunity and an easy supply of firepower to satisfy 
the demands of actors with malicious intent, both criminals and terrorists. And 
indeed, reactivated firearms from this ‘AFG line’ have made their way to 
French terrorists, UK gangsters, and German neo-Nazis (Der Spiegel, 24 
March 2016). 
 
Figure 3.  
Deactivated submachine gun (CZ vz 58) on AFG web shop 
 
Source: AFG website 
 
The most recent Dutch National Threat Assessment (Nationaal 
Dreigingsbeeld, 2017) indicates that such reactivated firearms make up a large 
proportion of the supply of firearms in the Netherlands, with almost 200 ‘re-
cycled’ automatic firearms found since 2012: rifles from manufacturer CZ 
akin to the famous AK 47, Skorpion machine-pistols as well as various pistols. 
Crucially, police investigations show that the majority of these firearms can 
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be traced back to the AFG webshop, with (illegal) reactivation taking place in 
Germany or the Netherlands.  
 While it is unclear exactly how many steps there are between reactivation 
of the firearms and their appearance on the market, it is clear that the final step 
before reaching the ‘customer’ was through (illegal) firearms dealers. Within 
the context of this study, it is this latter group of firearms dealers that repre-
sents the salient network(s) of organised crime.  
 Because of this case’s importance for law enforcement, the National Police 
had started to compile an AFG-database listing details about the apprehen-
sions and investigations where AFG firearms were found, including which 
persons were present when a firearm was discovered, how they were con-
nected to the firearm(s) (such as ‘in possession at time of apprehension’, ‘pre-
sent but not in possession’) and whether there had been active police investi-
gations into these persons. In total, more than 2.000 persons were listed in this 
way. This provided a rich data source that was leveraged as the starting point 
for the SNA.  
 As it was known that firearms dealers were involved in this case, our re-
search question could focus on whether, starting from this group, connections 
to terrorist cells could be discovered. 
 
c. Data collection 
 
Following the identification of the relevant case, the framework for the Social 
Network Analysis was developed. This was done by developing a data collec-
tion protocol (which criteria are relevant to our research questions), and a da-
tabase template.  
 Our research adopted an open-ended approach: neither the size of the group 
nor the individuals within it were known beforehand. The only ‘known’ was 
the point of departure: the initial group of subjects whose social network 
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would be mapped. Their connections, and their connections’ connections, be-
came only (fully) known during the course of the data collection.2 Theoreti-
cally, the pool of people in the databases could have been known if all of them 
were researched beforehand, but the salient relations between subsections of 
them could not have been.3  
 The study was able to draw on ‘raw’ police data present in the various 
databases of the Dutch National Police: information on the criminal record 
and history of apprehensions, arrests and convictions of all Dutch citizens, as 
well as information about family relations. Working arrangements were made 
to work on-site at the National Police premises, so that queries of these data-
bases were either performed or supervised by an authorised police analyst at 
all times. The extracted information has been coded, anonymised and pro-
cessed into a large database, indicating the personal characteristics and rela-
tions between (code-named) subjects. 
 To be able to work with the case, the group of over 2.000 subjects had to 
be reduced. First, this was necessary as it included many subjects that were 
simply not relevant for our purposes: innocent bystanders; (deceased) victims; 
those with only a very tenuous link to firearms. Second, as SNA is a labour-
intensive methodology that increases the number of subjects included expo-
nentially with each step, the starting group needed to be as small and focused 
as possible to avoid the noise overpowering the signal. We limited our file 
analysis to persons with a criminal record (persons implicated as suspects and 
those convicted of crimes). 
 To focus our efforts and eliminate non-relevant persons, a number of steps 
were followed to filter the 700 remaining subjects into three relevant roles. 
First, a distinction was made between those subjects that had been found in 
direct possession of a firearm, and those that had not been. The former were 
assigned the role of firearms possessor.  
                                                          
2  This is in contrast to when an SNA is applied to, for example, a typical company, 
where all the relevant persons (the employees) are known to the researchers be-
forehand. 
3  The only way this would have been possible is if it had been possible to engage 
with the detectives who handled the investigations. (This would have had the 
drawback of potentially steering the focus of the SNA towards particularly vivid 
cases for these investigators.) 
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Separately, the whole dataset was cross-checked in two ways: 
1. With police experts on the Dutch firearms trade, to identify (known) fire-
arms dealers – the second role in our SNA; 
2. With police experts monitoring extremists and (known) terrorists, to iden-
tify (suspected) terrorists – the third role in our SNA.  
 
Those subjects that were not assigned any of the three roles were subsequently 
expunged from our dataset. Following these steps, we obtained a list of 40 
persons divided into three relevant roles: 5 firearms dealers; 15 terrorist sus-
pects; 20 firearms possessors. Every person was assigned a single role. Logi-
cally, those identified as firearms dealers and terrorist suspects could also have 
possessed firearms, while those in the firearms possessors subgroup could not 
have been identified as firearms dealers or suspected terrorists as this would 
have meant changing their classification.  
 This group of 40 formed the starting point of the SNA. We then proceeded 
with ‘snowball sampling’ from our focal actors: each individual’s police file 
had a section elaborating the individuals associated with it through past (sus-
pected) crimes. This list of co-suspects and –convicts was added to the SNA 
as a first layer of contacts. Each of these newly added individuals was subse-
quently subjected to the same exercise, again analysing their police file for 
persons associated through past (suspected) crimes. 
 While building our database, we collected both relational and personal at-
tributes. The relational attribute answered whether subject a had a relation to 
subject b, based on association in their criminal record (they had been appre-
hended and/or convicted together in one or more cases). We also noted rec-
orded whether these persons were identified as firearms dealers, terrorist sus-
pects (labelled ‘CTER actors’ to distinguish them from the start group) or fire-










Data groups used in the study 
Data group Definition 
Starting group 40 persons identified from the AFG case, comprised of 
the 3 subgroups ‘firearms dealers’, ‘terrorist suspects’, 
and ‘firearms possessors’. 
Firearms dealers 
[start group] 
5 persons from the AFG case identified by police ex-
perts as known firearms dealers in the Netherlands 
Terrorist suspects 
[start group] 
15 persons from the AFG case identified by police ex-
perts as terrorist suspects in the Netherlands 
Firearms possessors 
[starting group] 
20 persons from the AFG case with a conviction for a 
firearms-related offence 
CTER actors All persons in the SNA database, identified as terrorist 
suspects in the Netherlands by police experts 
Firearms possessors All persons in the SNA database, identified as having a 
conviction for a firearms-related offence 
 
 
d. Measures  
 
Key in social network analysis is the concept of centrality. A strong, central 
network position of an actor is not only determined by the number of contacts 
the actor has, but also by the position the actor holds in the network, and the 
connectedness of his or her contacts. The following structural network char-
acteristics define the centrality of actors (see e.g., Freeman et al. 1991, Bor-
gatti 2005): 
▪ Degree centrality. Degree centrality measures the number of relations an 
actor has with other actors. It is higher the more connections an actor holds 
with other actors. In a directed – or asymmetric – network, we distin-
guish in-degree and out-degree, being the number of incoming ties, and the 
number of outgoing ties.  
▪ Betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality measures the importance 
of one actor in acting as a bridge between actors who would otherwise not 
be connected (Burt, 1992). These connecting actors do not necessarily need 
to have a high degree centrality but need just to act as a bridge between 
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two distant communities. By taking the position between two non-con-
nected groups, a ‘structural hole’ is filled (Burt, 1992). Taking such a 
bridge position is also known by the term ‘brokerage’. Betweenness 
centrality is measured by the number of times an actor fulfils a bridge po-
sition on the shortest path (defined by the number of dyadic ties) between 
two other actors within the network. 
▪ Closeness centrality. Closeness centrality measures the distance of one ac-
tor to all other actors in the network. The more direct relations exist be-
tween actors, the higher closeness centrality is. It can be regarded as a 
measure of how long it will take to spread information from one actor to 
all other actors. Closeness centrality is calculated via the sum of the length 
of the shortest paths between an actor and all other actors in the network.  
▪ Eigenvector centrality. Eigenvector centrality takes into account the rela-
tive importance of the relations of actors, instead of merely the number of 
relations. In networks that are larger and more complex, measuring only 
closeness centrality does not always suffice. Eigenvector centrality pro-
vides a relative score, in which actors who have relations with more central 
actors, score higher than actors with the same number of relations, but with 
less central actors. Thus, actors with high eigenvector centrality have more 





a. Network characteristics 
 
The 40 key actors who were central to our analysis have led to a network of 
724 actors, who have 4.340 connections with each other, defined by (sus-
pected) co-offending ties (see Table 2). This is a low density or sparse net-
work, indicated by the network density of 0,8%, meaning 0,8% of all possible 
relations between the actors has been established. Of course, the nature of the 
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network is a logical consequence of the methodological choice to base rela-
tions solely on associations through a criminal record. It remains an open 
question what this says about the density of the underlying social networks. 
 Furthermore, we see that the network exists of 22 components, which are 
isolated from each other. Based on our data collection and analysis, we see no 
overarching network emerging. This is (also) a consequence of our method of 
snowball sampling starting with 40 focal actors (start group), which were not 
connected to each other up-front.  
 
Table 2. 
Network characteristics  
Aspect Number 
Actors 724 
CTER actors identified 108 





We have identified nine of the 22 components as crucial for answering our 
research question, based on the following indicators: 
1. The component “DEALERS” contains all five identified firearms dealers; 
2. Seven of the components contain terrorist suspects (TERROR 1 -7);  
3. One of the components (TERROR 8) identifies terrorist suspects in the 
network of a person in the start group. 
 
The other network components are either too small or contain no relevant sub-
jects from our starting group. We first describe the network characteristics of 
the start group, followed by a description of the components in detail. 
 As we do not have information on the complete network of all actors iden-
tified, the network measures are skewed for those actors in the start group: 
because we have more information for the start group, their centrality is higher 
by definition. Therefore, we report the centrality measures regarding our 40 
persons from the start group. The centrality measures are based on the central-
ity within the component the actor is located in. We have presented the 
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measures for the firearms dealers, terrorist suspects as well as the start group 
as a whole. 
 
Table 3. 
Degree centrality start group 
Group Mean Min - max N 
Degree centrality 
Start group 18,8 3 – 73 40 
Firearms dealers  11,6 3 – 19 5 
Terrorist suspects  
(start group) 
24,5 3 – 73 15 
Closeness centrality  
Start group 0,01 (0,00 – 0,11) 40 
Firearms dealers 0,00 (0,00 – 0,00) 5 
Terrorist suspects  
(start group) 
0,02 (0,00 – 0,11) 15 
Betweenness centrality 
Start group 0,57 (0 – 5,09) 40 
Firearms dealers 0,19 (0 – 0,40) 5 
Terrorist suspects  
(start group) 
0,80 (0 – 5,09) 15 
Eigenvector centrality 
Start group 0,27 (0 – 0,69) 40 
Firearms dealers 0,07 (0 – 0,30) 5 
Terrorist suspects  
(start group) 
0,23 (0 – 0,56) 15 
 
For degree centrality, we see an average score of 18,8 indicating that actors in 
the start group are related to an average of about 19 other nodes in their re-
spective components. The maximum of actors someone is related to is 73 in 
the case of a terrorist suspect, which skews the average of the terrorist suspects 
group (average of 24,5). The average degree centrality score for the firearms 
dealers is lower (11,6; N=5). Terrorist suspects (N=15) have more relations 
than firearms dealers. The other centrality measures also indicate that terrorist 





b.  Network of firearms dealers 
 
After looking at the start group, we zoom in on the relevant components. All 
firearms dealers can be found in one component with 55 actors (component 
DEALERS; see Figure 4). In this sense, the SNA ‘shows’ that they are part of 
the same space in the underworld. At the same time the firearms dealers have 
a rather peripheral position in the overall network of 724 actors. Relatively 
speaking they do not have many connections and do not occupy a central po-
sition.  
 The firearms dealers are not all connected to each other directly, and 
mostly fulfil bridge positions to each other’s ego-centric networks (see Figure 
4). Weapon dealers 1 and 2 score high on betweenness centrality in component 
DEALERS: they connect other networks of actors within the component. 
Weapon dealer 4 scores highest on eigenvector centrality, indicating he has 
most relations to others who are themselves well-connected.  
  
Figure 4.  
Component DEALERS, five firearms dealers 
 
Legend: 
• W1-W5: firearms dealers 
• Red: present on the CTER suspect list 
• Triangle: convicted for firearms possession (‘Wwm-feit’ under Dutch law), proxy 




Furthermore, there are three actors in this sub-network, who are in the CTER 
database. Two of these have a direct connection to one of the firearms dealers. 
This indicates that firearms dealers are in direct contact with subjects that are 
flagged as persons of interest regarding potential terrorist motives. These ac-
tors are highly likely to be able to obtain firearms from their connections.  
 
c.  Networks of terrorist suspects  
 
We identified seven components around terrorist suspects in our start group 
(see Figure 5). Within these components, there are almost invariably subjects 
that have been found to be in possession of firearms. In other words, in most 
cases firearms are in circulation within the networks of terrorist suspects. One 
can surmise these would be relatively easy to acquire by these subjects.  
 Figure 5 shows the seven components. This visualisation reveals that the 
size of these sub-networks varies substantially, ranging from 4 to 204 actors 
per component. As a consequence of our data collection method, the terrorist 
suspects have most connections. Several clusters within the components in 
which they are prominently represented, are connected by bridging actors. In 
other networks, the terrorist suspects fulfil bridge positions themselves.  
 In component TERROR 1 there are 38 actors. One of the terrorist suspects 
(red triangle) is most central, and also convicted for firearms possession. Com-
ponent TERROR 2 is the largest component with 204 actors. Again, one of 
the terrorist suspects is most central in this component. Furthermore, a number 
of actors who are not included in the start group have been identified as cen-
tral. Component TERROR 3 is the smallest component, with 4 actors, 2 of 
which are terrorist suspects. Both of them are connected to all others in the 
component, while no direct link exists between the two non-terrorist suspects. 
 Component TERROR 4 contains 81 actors, who are connected by two cen-
tral bridge positions, fulfilled by terrorist suspects, who have been also con-
victed for firearms possession. Component TERROR 5 consist of 21 actors, 
built around a terrorist suspect. Four other actors – outside of the start group, 
but known in the terrorist database – are identified as being highly central in 
the component. Those four actors are all directly connected to the terrorist 
suspect in the most central position.  
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 Component 6 consists of 112 actors. In this network, two terrorist suspects 
and three non-start group actors are highly central. The terrorist suspects score 
high on eigenvector centrality, while the non-start group actors mostly have 
high scores regarding betweenness centrality. Finally, component 7 contains 
22 actors, revolving around one central terrorist suspect.   
 The information from these components reveals that the terrorist suspects 
are (indirectly) connected to each other within the components, but also to a 
large network of persons with a criminal background, especially visible in sub-
networks 2 and 6. Also, weapons are within arm’s reach for many actors 
within these components. This may indicate that terrorist suspects can obtain 
a firearm relatively easily. 
 
Figure 5. 
Components containing terrorist suspects 
 
Legend: 
▪ Red: terrorist suspects part of start group 
▪ Size: bigger symbol indicates subject now or in the past under active investiga-
tion on counter-terrorism concerns 
▪ Triangle: convicted for firearms possession (‘Wwm-feit’ under Dutch law), 








d.  Network with identified terrorist suspects 
 
Apart from the component including the five arms dealers, and the seven com-
ponents comprising terrorist suspects, there is a ninth component (TERROR 
8; see Figure 6) relevant for our analysis, which revolves around an actor iden-
tified in the start group who is neither an arms dealer nor a suspected terrorist. 
This individual (SG_13) was identified in the start group due to a direct link 
to an AFG-weapon (for which he had not been convicted during the timespan 
of our study). In drawing up the connections of this individual (SG_13), four 
actors were identified who are known in the terrorist database, and of which 
one was known in a terrorist investigation at the time of our study.  
 Component TERROR 8 consists of 27 actors, of which SG_13 as well as 
three other individuals occupy the most central positions. One of the latter 
three individuals (MV_560) is known in the terrorist database. The connection 
between SG_13 and MV_560 may indicate a relation between AFG and ter-
rorism given SG_13’s direct link to an AFG sourced weapon.  
 
Figure 6.  
Component TERROR 8, network with terrorist suspects 
 
Legend: 
▪ Red: terrorist suspects part of start group 
▪ Size: bigger symbol indicates subject now or in the past under active investiga-
tion on counter-terrorism concerns 
▪ Triangle: convicted for firearms possession (‘Wwm-feit’ under Dutch law), 






a.  On acquisition of firearms 
 
In this section we reflect on how the findings relate to the research question 
and draw a number of (tentative) conclusions.  
 At an early stage of the case study, it became clear that the terrorist suspects 
had access to firearms from the AFG supply line. Crucially, within the ‘fire-
arms dealers network’ (component 10) we have identified several terrorist sus-
pects who have either a direct (one step) or indirect (two steps) link to these 
dealers. Further research (or police investigation) at subject-level into how 
exactly they acquired those firearms would be fruitful. However, the charac-
teristics of the network(s) arising from our SNA indicates it is highly likely 
these were directly or indirectly acquired via Dutch firearms dealers, seems to 
lend support to what we would expect based on the alleged crime-terror link 
discussed in the (academic) literature.  
 
b.  On the interwovenness of organised crime and terrorism 
 
At the same time, some of our findings are noteworthy. Most importantly, our 
case study does not show evidence that there is an interwovenness between 
organised crime and terrorism. This conclusion can be broken down into a 
number of distinct elements. 
 The results of our case study seem to imply that the firearms trade in the 
Netherlands can rightly be considered as ‘organised’ crime: all five firearms 
dealers identified within the case are linked through their presence in one net-
work and it is not farfetched to assume they know each other. 
 Structurally speaking, the case study does not reveal a coherent terrorist 
network in the Netherlands. Rather, we find many smaller sub-networks that 
contain a few terrorist suspects and many criminals who interact with each 
other. One conclusion is therefore that at the individual level, there is an inter-
wovenness or interconnectedness between criminals and terrorists (who often 
are or have been criminals themselves). In some cases, terrorist suspects per-
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form a central role in a network, or act as a ‘bridge’ between otherwise uncon-
nected networks. However, this cannot be qualified as an organised crime 
nexus: that would require a more comprehensive, structural interface between 
the two types of networks. 
 At the same time, as we have not seen a coherent terrorist organisation 
emerge from our data, it logically follows that based on our study it cannot be 
concluded that there is an interwovenness of organised crime and terrorism at 
the group or structural level.  
 In relation to this point, it is important to explicitly note that the absence 
of interwovenness also (logically) cannot be confirmed: we have not seen 
these networks in our case, but this absence could be caused either by their 
non-existence or be a result of the scope of the study. Perhaps these would 
have emerged if the network were mapped to one additional degree of rela-
tions. The arrests of a number of terrorist suspects last year (2 in June, 7 in 
September and 5 in December 2018; see Trouw, 29 December 2018), who 
have all been charged with membership of a terrorist network and with con-
spiring to plan a terrorist attack, indicates that looser terrorist networks or cells 
are present in the Netherlands. It is important to monitor the progress of these 
court cases, to identify the nature of these looser networks and, in case these 




Discussion and the way forward 
 
a. Avenues for further research 
 
Our study has been able to draw on primary sources from the police in order 
to build our SNA database. Coding has been based on police files, validated 
and complemented by inputs from specialised police teams. It has not been 
possible to include ‘richer’ information on the context of specific cases and 
subjects, which would be present with the detectives responsible for working 
the cases. As a result, our research has been able to lay bare the ‘bone struc-
ture’ of the networks.  
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 A fruitful next step would be to ‘put some flesh on the bones’ by involving 
those detectives and enriching the analysis with a contextual understanding. 
Subject a is related to subject b, but are they casual acquaintances, close 
friends, or partners turned enemies? Did they actually know each other?4 Fire-
arms dealer x knows terrorist subject y, but what is the meaning of this rela-
tionship – are they childhood friends, or ‘accidentally’ connected by a com-
mon acquaintance? Considering how labour-intense this unravelling could be, 
our suggestion would be to focus on the 15 persons that our SNA has high-
lighted as being of particular relevance, due to (the combination of) their per-
sonal characteristics and their position in their respective networks. 
 Based on the experience gained during the study, SNA is a very fruitful 
approach for further (applied) criminological research. The method is scala-
ble, so that any characteristic or type of relationship that is deemed relevant 
can be included in a specific model. 
 The method is also adaptive: it can relatively easily be applied to other 
areas of interest, such as outlaw motor gangs and the drugs trade. The only 
limiting precondition is that sufficient data needs to be available. Through 
combining primary data from police databases with expert knowledge from 
specialist police teams (further complemented by outside experts), this is a 
hurdle that can be overcome. 
 Although coding of the subjects and the creation of the database can be 
time-consuming, on the whole the method could prove to be a time saver for 
police analysts and investigators, for whom the need to prioritise is immense. 
Using network positions and personal characteristics, it is possible to identify 
a select number of key subjects, on whom an investigation could usefully fo-
cus.  
 In addition, mapping the structure of a network allows previously unseen 
(because indirect) links between phenomena to be recognised, and potential 
blind spots to be discovered more easily. Police work would stand to gain from 
more structurally implementing these approaches.  
                                                          
4  In the worst case, they could have been incidentally lumped together in the system 
by careless registration. 
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 In our case, some 15 subjects already known to the police have been 
flagged as of interest for further investigation, and two new subjects have been 
flagged as of interest from a counter-terrorism and radicalism perspective. 
 
b. Reflections on the applicability for police work 
 
Although SNA is not an alien methodology for many police analysts, it seems 
that mapping of a social network often only occurs on a subject basis (who is 
this suspect in contact with?) and not on a phenomenon or more strategic level 
(what, if any, are the links between different criminal groups?).  
 The applied method of systematically combining information from differ-
ent fields of expertise (in our case: intelligence on firearms and on terrorism) 
leads to new insights. The added value can be seen on two levels: 
▪ By mapping the social network of suspects, relationships are uncovered 
that may be instructive when assessing threats and whom to prioritise. A 
systematic approach allows for clear-cut choices in this prioritisation, 
which can lead to more efficient use of resources (personnel, time and 
money). 
▪ Regular cross-checks of actors from different fields (firearms dealers, ex-
tremists, firearms users), their connections, density of their networks can 
lead to the identification of overlap between phenomena that had not been 
recognised before. This furthers our (theoretical) understanding of the sub-
jects of this study 
  
A further deepening of this theme is recommended as a result of this explora-
tion. In the context of this research, a number of concrete possibilities have 
been described for how to apply SNA within the police agencies to this theme 
and related issues. SNA can support the process of gathering further infor-
mation regarding the nexus of organised crime and terrorist jihadi groups, and 






c. Limitations and opportunities for further research 
 
A fundamental question is to what extent social structures can meaningfully 
be captured with the network model. This discussion is beyond the scope of 
this article, although we note that the often transactional nature of criminal 
relations would seem a priori to be suitable for a network model.  
 In addition, this study has some more specific limitations that need to be 
recognised – which hint at opportunities for further fruitful research. These 
fall into three categories: 
▪ Data: the information (made) available to us was limited to primary data 
from the police databases, supplemented by specialist expertise. Further 
research would benefit from involving detectives involved in specific 
cases. Concretely, one should consult the investigators who have ‘human 
intelligence’ on those identified as key actors within a social network. 
▪ Reliability: it is known that primary police databases suffer from a certain 
level of data pollution as a result of incorrect or incomplete registrations. 
Researchers should recognise this, and adopt the strategy outlined in the 
previous point: consult the relevant detectives. 
▪ Robustness: our findings are liable to change if further layers of connec-
tions are added to the network. It could be that such an expansion of the 
network in will reveals for example, a network of loosely federated terror-
ist cells. Future studies need to keep in mind that there should be a balance 
between on the one hand ‘completeness’ of the networks, and on the 
other the strength of the connections thus discovered (to what extent are 
third-degree connections indicative of a robust organisation?), com-
pounded by practical concerns about the trade-off with the time spent on 
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